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Abstract 
 
This paper provides empirical evidence to support the theory that, in Italy, over 
the course of the past two years, even though a considerable slowdown in bank 
lending has been recorded, there has not been a credit crunch. After a first section 
dedicated to a descriptive analysis of the data, the paper presents an econometric 
estimation of the production sector’s demand for bank loans. An Error Correction 
Model (ECM) is used – estimated for the pre-crisis period (1998.Q2 – 2007.Q2) 
and applied both with the one and two step procedure – which considers lending 
as a function of the added value of the private sector, of the gross operating 
margin to nominal added value ratio (a proxy for self-financing) and of the real 
interest rate applied to loans. To test the robustness of the results obtained in the 
first specification of the model, we remove the assumption of weak exogeneity of 
the independent variables of the single equation model and construct a 
multivariate multi-equation model (VECM). All of the different approaches and 
methods adopted provided similar results: as expected, the demand for credit 
increases as real added value increases and decreases as the cost of lending and 
self-financing increase. The dynamic out-of-sample forecast of the model, relating 
to the two-year period of economic and financial crisis (2007.Q3 – 2009.Q2), 
shows that the actual loan stock remained well above the “theoretical” level 
forecasted on the basis of the functional relationships estimated before the crisis. 
This delta (which can be defined as “extra-credit”) is interpreted as the outcome of 
a rightward shift of the credit supply curve, rather than a leftward shift as would 
have happened in a credit crunch scenario. 
 
 
Keywords: credit crunch, Italian banks, bank lending, production sector, loan demand, error 
correction model, cointegration  
 
JEL Classification: C32, C51, E44 
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Non-technical summary 
 
This paper analyses the interaction between the dynamics of bank lending to 
the production sector and the macroeconomic scenario, in order to verify the 
hypothesis about the existence of a credit crunch in Italy during the recent 
financial and economic crisis. According to the definition available in literature, a 
credit crunch represents a decline in the supply of credit (leftward shift of the 
curve) of an excessive and anomalous magnitude with respect to the business cycle 
trend. Even in the presence of a significant slowdown in the growth rate of loans, 
developments in the credit market have been relatively positive during the crisis, 
given the severe decline in economic activity. Over the course of 2008, and in the 
first six months of 2009, the bank credit-to-GDP ratio – namely credit per product 
unit – has slowed down, but has never fallen, demonstrating a far superior trend 
than that recorded in previous downturns identified by the International Monetary 
Fund, which in a recent study established the threshold of annual growth in the 
bank credit-to-GDP ratio, beyond which we can speak of credit squeeze/crunch, 
as between -0.6 and -1%. After having provided descriptive evidence, the paper 
focuses on an analysis of the relationships between credit and economic trends 
and, using econometric techniques, estimates the demand for credit as a function, 
inter alia, of the production activity, the levels of private sector self-financing and 
the real interest rate applied to loans. On the basis of the relationships that have 
been established between these variables in the pre-crisis period (between the 
second quarter of 1998 and the second quarter of 2007), we estimate what the 
outstanding loans would have been in the crisis period if the banks had strictly 
observed these relationships; we then compare this “theoretical” value with the 
actual value. Our results show that in Italy, as of the third quarter of 2007 – 
namely since the beginning of the financial crisis – the outstanding loans figure 
was significantly superior to that “compatible” with a macroeconomic scenario 
marked by an exceptional decline. As the crisis worsened, the distance between 
actual credit and theoretical credit increased, exceeding 80 billion euro (a sort of 
“extra-credit” corresponding to over 10% of loan stock). If other factors are 
considered equal and given the difficult economic scenario, the higher propensity 
to grant credit could be interpreted as an increased attention of the banking 
industry on all of those aspects – beyond traditional ones – that tend to reinforce 
medium/long run relationships with customers (higher consideration of the 
enterprise’s income prospects, personal and long lasting relationships with 
enterprenuers , etc.).   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Economic literature and past experience show that credit and finance play a 
decisive role in economic growth. The occurrence of an epoch-making financial 
crisis and of one of the most severe recessions in economic history has therefore 
led to questions, throughout the world, as to the risk that the generalised process 
of bank deleveraging and the rapid deterioration of the income conditions of 
households and enterprise could generate a credit crunch with consequent negative 
repercussions on production activity. Over the course of the past year, this debate 
seen the massive involvement of governments and social parties and on many 
occasions there has been explicit reference, in alarmist tones, to the presence of a 
credit crunch.  
There are different grounds underlying the considerable interest that this topic 
is arousing: context, structural and empirical.  In terms of context, we refer to the 
exceptional gravity that has characterised the economic recessions which, in Italy, 
was already showing in average figures for 2008 (-1% the annual GDP growth). 
The structural grounds are based on the fact that in Italy the weight of bank debt 
in sources of corporate funding (particularly of small and medium sized 
enterprises) is higher than elsewhere1. Lastly, the empirical grounds are based on 
the observation that in the past year and a half we have actually seen a significant 
slowdown in the growth of loans to the production sector.  
The rationale, therefore, for this paper is the need to further explore a topic 
that is extremely important for our economy, in order to verify if there are actually 
grounds to sustain that there has been a credit crunch in Italy. It contributes to the 
debate on three fronts: 1) it describes and evaluates credit dynamics using different 
methods; 2) it estimates a loan demand model for the historic period before the 
financial crisis; 3) it uses said model and offers proof that would seem to counter 
the hypothesis of a credit crunch.  
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of the 
development of the credit situation in the past two years; Section 3 provides the 
economic meaning of credit crunch on the basis of the approach commonly used 
in literature; Section 4 provides the first descriptive tools to be able to evaluate the 
presence, or otherwise, of a credit crunch in Italy, correlating credit trends with 
those of industrial production and GDP; Section 5 econometrically estimates a 
demand for loans function and uses it to compare the amount of actual loans with 
that forecasted on the basis of the model estimated in the pre-crisis period; Section 
6 summarises the main conclusions.  
                                                 
1 At the end of 2003 bank loans corresponded to 71% of corporate indebtedness, against 55% 
in Germany, 35% in France and 47% in the United States (Casolaro, Eramo and Gambacorta; 
2006). 
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2. THE CREDIT SITUATION 
As the economic and financial crisis has unfolded over the past two years, the 
annual growth rate of loans to the private sector (production sector and consumer 
households), calculated on seasonally-adjusted data2, has decreased significantly 
(Graph 1) falling from +12.9% in October 2007 to +1.5% in August 2009. The 
economic situation confirms that total loans to the private sector are stagnating: 
over the past six months, annualised quarterly changes have fluctuated between 
values of -0.5 and +2% (+0.2% in August 2009). 
Looking at loans to households and loans to enterprises separately, we can see 
that while during the first stage of the crisis the slowdown mainly regarded 
consumer households, over the course of the past year, it has particularly affected 
the production sector (both medium-large and small non-financial firms)3. Graph 2 
shows that the annual growth rate of loans to consumer households, after having 
dropped to its lowest point last February (+1%), has started to rise in recent 
months (+4.5% in August); even the annualised quarterly growth does not provide 
reason for concern. On the other hand, loans to the production sector, which until 
last September were growing at an annual rate of 10.6%, during this stage appear 
to be less promising, and showed a significant slowdown (Graph 3); for this 
aggregate, the economic situation signals a recessionary trend (the annualised 
quarterly change last August -2.1%; -3.2% in July).  
The economic situation therefore suggests further exploration of the dynamics 
of loans to the production sector, for which there are heightened fears of a credit 
crunch at this stage. To establish an initial framework, we need to read the 
dynamics commented on above with relation to what has happened at 
international level.   
At international level, there appears to be a widespread tendency towards the 
stagnation of loans to enterprises. Within the euro area, the Italian situation 
appears to the least worrying. As of last April, the annualised quarterly growth rate 
of loans to non-financial firms (seasonally-adjusted) in Italy was constantly above 
that recorded in Germany, France, Spain and the euro area as a whole (Graph 4): 
the last figure for August shows a growth of 0.6% in Italy against a fall of 5% in 
the euro area (-5.2% in Germany; -3.6% in France; -7.3% in Spain). 
                                                 
2 In all of the calculation in this paper, seasonal adjustments have been carried out using the 
Tramo/Seats procedure. 
3 A recent study by the ECB shows that, overall, analysing credit and GDP trends in the euro 
area from 1980 to date, average historical regularities suggest that the annual growth of real 
loans to households slightly leads real GDP growth, while the growth in loans to non-financial 
corporations clearly lags growth in real GDP (European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin, October 
2009). 
 8
3. CREDIT CRUNCH: DEFINITION AND ANALYSIS TOOLS 
In order to verify the existence, if any, of a credit crunch, we first have to 
establish the economic meaning of this term. The definition of credit crunch most 
commonly used in literature is that of Bernanke and Lown (1991, p.207): “a 
significant leftward shift in the supply of bank loans, holding constant both the 
real interest rate and the quality of potential borrowers”.  
According to this definition, a credit crunch represents a decline in the supply 
of credit (leftward shift of the curve) of an excessive and anomalous magnitude 
with respect to the trend of the business cycle4; the focal point, therefore, entails 
valuing the decline in the supply of credit against the performance of the economy, 
taking for granted the fact that the bank lending tends to normally and 
physiologically slow down or decline during a period of recession.  
This definition suggests two analysis approaches:  
a) a more description approach, expanded in section 4, which entails comparing 
the credit trend with those of the main indicators of the business cycle (industrial 
production and GDP);  
b) a more analytical approach, illustrated in section 5, which is based on the 
construction of an econometric model, which explains credit trends as a function 
of its determinants and which emphasises the short and long run statistical relation 
between credit variables and the macroeconomic scenario. 
4. CREDIT AND PRODUCTION ACTIVITY DURING THE 
CRISIS 
As highlighted in Section 2, loans to the production sector have shown a 
marked slowdown in 2008-09. In the same period, the industrial production index 
(a possible proxy of the firm’s credit demand for new investment in industry) 
collapsed to all intents and purposes, further deteriorating as of September 2008: 
the annual change of the seasonally-adjusted series fell from +3.2% in July 2007 to 
-24.9% last March, only partially recovering in recent months. The slowdown in 
credit was actually fairly modest if compared to industrial production dynamics 
(Graph 5)5: loans continued to rise y-o-y, also in the presence of a downsizing of 
investment projects by companies6. A similar conclusion is reached if the long-run 
                                                 
4 For more details on the interpretation and the causes of the credit crunch, see Clair and 
Tucker (1993). 
5 The comparison between the trend of the industrial production index and loan dynamics has 
a limitation stemming from the fact that we are comparing a nominal aggregate (loans) to an 
index expressed instead in real terms (industrial production). However, our calculations show 
that even if loans are deflated with the price index (consumer and production),the same 
conclusions are reached: the slowdown in loans (in real terms) over the past one and a half 
years has been decidedly more contained that the collapse of the production index.  
6 The significant fall in the demand for loans by enterprises to fund new investment projects is 
confirmed by the results of a recent survey on bank lending (Bank Lending Survey) conducted 
by the Bank of Italy and the European Central Bank. 
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trend7 is removed from outstanding loans and the industrial production index 
(Graph 6). 
To what extent can it be claimed that the collapse of industrial production led 
to the slowdown in lending? Granger’s causality test (Granger; 1969) shows that, 
by using the cyclical components of the two time series analysed in the last decade, 
this claim could be upheld: the results obtained say, in fact, that the production 
index causes bank loans and not the contrary (Table 1)8. This substantiates the 
conclusion that lending slowed down during the crisis due to the very high and 
more than proportional fall in the firm’s loans demand for new investments.  
However, the analysis conducted above has three critical aspects. Firstly, it was 
conducted on a relatively limited historic time period: as a longer homogeneous 
time series for loans was not available, only the last decade was considered;  this 
does not enable us to verify what happened in past recessions (such as for example 
that of 1992-93).  
Furthermore, note that industrial production, unlike loans, is expressed in real 
terms and, as it does not include services, regards a sector that represents less than  
30% of added value.  
Lastly – passing to the third critical aspect – only the demand for loans to fund 
new investment projects has been considered, ignoring for example the fact that 
the demand for loans may also increase to cover new liquidity requirements that 
have occurred due to a sudden fall in self-financing.  
To circumvent the latter problem, all of the possible determinants of the 
demand for loans must be considered: the econometric model developed in 
Section 5 seeks to offer a solution to this aspect. 
With regard, on the other hand, to the first two critical aspects, a first 
improvement of the analysis was made by observing credit dynamics with relation 
to the trend of nominal GDP, both recently and with regard to Italian recessions 
in past decades. As a uniform time series for loans for the period prior to 1998 is 
not available, a recent research conducted by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) was used, which explores the topic of credit crunch, using data for Italy 
from 1970 onwards (IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2008)9.  
Following Bernanke and Lown’s definition, the IMF has defined a bank credit 
squeeze “as a slowdown in the growth rate of the bank credit-to-GDP ratio 
sharper than that experienced during a normal business cycle downturn” and a 
bank credit crunch as “a severe bank credit squeeze driven by a significant decline 
                                                 
7 The long-run trend was calculated by applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Again, results are 
similar even if loans are considered in real terms (deflated with the consumer or production 
price index). 
8 This result is obtained by considering both loans in nominal and real terms (deflated with the 
consumer price index). 
9 The time period analysed for Italy in this IMF study is that between the first quarter of 1970 
and the second quarter of 2007. Therefore, it does not take the lending trend in the last two 
years into account.  
 10
in the banking system’s supply of credit” (IMF World Economic Outlook, April 
2008, pp. 10-11)10. Its empirical study shows that, on the basis of the historic 
evidence considered, in Italy we should talk about a credit squeeze/crunch11 in the 
presence of an annual rate of change of the bank credit-to-GDP ratio of between 
0.6 and 1%12. 
Calculated on the total amount of loans disbursed to the production sector, the 
annual rate of change of the bank credit-to-GDP ratio13 fell in 2008 and in the first 
half of 2009 (Graph 7), but it has still remained decidedly positive (from +9.1% in 
the first quarter of last year to +3.8% in the second quarter of this year), showing, 
in any event, a value that is considerably higher than the -0.6% threshold indicated 
by the IMF and than the lowest value recorded in the past nine years (+1.4% at 
the end of 2004).  
The analysis of the bank credit-to-GDP ratio would appear to indicate better 
credit (per unit of GDP) dynamics for the past two years with respect to the trend 
shown in previous downturns experienced from 197014 onwards, and enable us to 
reject the hypothesis of both credit crunch and credit squeeze. 
                                                 
10 As stated by the IMF, “factors that could limit the banking system’s supply of credit,and 
therefore transform a squeeze into a crunch, include banks’ inability to raise core funding or 
retain them due to a run, as well as banks’ inability to raise funds through debt or equity 
issuance on capital markets”. 
11 As illustrated in the definitions, the two levels of judgement depend, in addition to the 
extent of the downturn of the index, also by the degree of involvement of the supply side and 
on potentially distressed bank conditions (presence of a crisis). On the basis of this 
observation, if in the last two years we were to encounter a downturn in the bank credit-to-
GDP ratio that is higher than the threshold indicated by the IMF, it would automatically be 
interpreted as a credit crunch, given the gravity and exceptional nature of the recent financial 
crisis.  
12 In its study, the IMF establishes this threshold by identifying the episodes of credit 
squeeze/crunch in all of those quarters in which the rate of growth of the bank credit-to-GDP 
index was in the lowest decile of the distribution. Said episodes occurred in Italy between the 
fourth quarter of 1993 and the second quarter of 1996.  
13 The bank credit-to-GDP ratio is calculated as the ratio between the seasonally adjusted good 
loans (net of the non performing loans) and the four periods mobile sum of nominal GDP.  
14 Another interesting study on credit dynamics in recession periods is that published by the 
Bank of Italy last July (Bassanetti et al; 2009). The outcome of their analysis is that loans to 
the private sector, if measured in nominal terms, in the current crisis, have demonstrated a 
profile in line with previous recessions (1974 and 1992-93). In real terms, on the other hand, 
the slowdown of loans would appear to be more accentuated than in 1992-93 (when, however, 
it lasted for around ten quarters) and less brusque than that of 1974. In this evaluation, we 
must, nevertheless, take into account the higher level of intensity of the current recession, 
which has so far had a predominantly industrial nature. Even the fall in the loans to GDP ratio 
has been shown in this study to be more severe than in the 1974 recession, with respect to 
what is happening today, while in the 1992-93 recession, the significant decrease of the loans 
to GDP ratio occurred with a certain lag and lasted for around four years. These results do not 
appear to significantly contrast with those obtained in this paper. 
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5. BANK LENDING AND CREDIT DEMAND: AN 
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
The comparison between trend of loans and industrial production dynamics  
would almost appear to point to an excess of credit supply with respect to the 
demand for loans by companies to fund new investment. This gap could however 
be explained by the increase in the demand for bank loans to cover the lack of 
resources that companies are able to draw upon through self-financing. On the 
other hand, lending dynamics have certainly also been influenced by other factors, 
the role of which can be understood and measured using an econometric analysis.  
In line with a research approach that returned to popularity in the early 90’s15, 
we therefore constructed and estimated an equation able to summarise the 
relationships that link credit demand with its main determinants.  
This analysis, conducted on the basis of a quarterly database covering the 
period between the second quarter of 1998 and the second quarter of 2009, breaks 
down into two stages:   
1) in the first (Section 5.1) we estimate an equation for the demand for loans in 
the pre-crisis period (up until the second quarter of 2007) in order to verify what 
were the relationships that linked credit to the variables of the scenario under 
normal conditions, namely before the structural break, caused by the financial 
crisis, occurred;   
2) in the second (Section 5.2) we used the relationships estimated above for the 
pre-crisis period and we make an out-of-sample dynamic forecast for the last two 
years (2007.Q3 - 2009.Q2), in order to compare the amount of actual credit with 
the amount that the model would have predicted on the basis of the evolution of 
the economic scenario. 
5.1 A loan demand model in the pre-crisis period  
The basic model used is an Error Correction Model (ECM), which links – in 
the short and long run – loans to the production sector with the cost of lending 
and with some indicators on production levels and on the self-financing capacity 
of the private sector (added value and gross operating margin).  
This model was applied using three different approaches: 
A. The the two-step procedure ECM by Engle and Granger (1987), in which 
first the long-run equation is estimated and then the short-run relation; 
B. The one-step procedure ECM, in which short and long-run equations are 
estimated simultaneously; 
                                                 
15 See in particular Sorensen, Ibanez e Rossi (2009), Gambacorta and Rossi (2007), Casolaro, 
Eramo and Gambacorta (2006), Calza, Manrique and Sousa (2006) and Calza, Gartner and 
Sousa (2003). 
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C. The Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), with a multivariate analysis 
characterised by a system with several simultaneous equations. 
In the first two equations, we use the basic assumption of weak exogeneity of 
the independent variables used in the loans equation, considering the credit trend 
as the only endogenous variable. The VECM represents an alternative model, 
which enables us to eliminate the assumption of weak exogeneity of the lending 
determinants and to consider all of the variables analysed as endogenous. 
The variables used are defined as follows:  
IMP = loans to the production sector (both medium-large and small non-financial 
firms) resident in Italy, net of gross non performing loans (end-of-quarter 
outstandings, seasonally-adjusted data); 
VAK = added value of the private sector16 expressed in real terms (at constant 
prices, seasonally-adjusted data); 
VAN = added value of the private sector expressed in nominal terms (at current 
prices, seasonally-adjusted data); 
MOL = gross operating margin (VAN – total labour cost); 
TIMP = average real interest rate17 on loans to medium-large non-financial firms18 
(calculated on outstanding loans; end-of-quarter data). 
The source of the bank variables is the Bank of Italy, while Istat is the source of 
those relating to gross operating margin and added value.  
The first objective of the analysis is to estimate a credit demand function of the 
following type: ),/,( TIMPVANMOLVAKfIMP = .  
The demand for loans, according to economic theory, falls as the interest rate 
applied to the same rises: from the estimations, we would expect a minus sign for 
the coefficient associated to the variable TIMP.  
In the credit demand equation that we wish to consider, VAK represents the 
scale variable19. Added value is a production indicator: as VAK rises, it would be 
fair to expect a higher demand for bank loans (we would expect a coefficient with 
a plus sign). 
On the other hand, the gross operating margin represents gross operating profit 
before amortization and depreciation and corresponds to what remains of added 
                                                 
16 The added value of the private sector was calculated by subtracting the “non market” 
portion provided by Istat from total added value.  
17 The real interest rate was calculated by deflating the nominal interest rate with the annual 
growth rate of the added value deflator of the private sector. 
18 In the calculation of the average real interest rate, loans to smaller firms have not been 
considered as not available in the data provided by Bank of Italy.  
19 In the credit demand function in question, the added value expressed in nominal terms 
already appears as the denominator of the MOL/VAN ratio. To avoid problems of collinearity 
between regressors, we therefore decided to use the added value expressed in real terms as 
the scale variable of firm’s activity. 
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value after having deducted labour costs; so it incorporates the level of self-
financing generated before any extraordinary charges or income, financial charges 
and taxes. The MOL is very important for the operating management analysis: it is 
not influenced by any accounting policies regarding amortizations, depreciations or 
allowances and shows a company’s self-financing capacity. If other factors are 
equal, an increase of MOL/VAN increases a company’s self-financing capacity 
and should lead to a lower demand for bank lending: we therefore expect the 
coefficient for this variable to have a minus sign.  
A descriptive analysis, over the whole period considered, shows how there is a 
strong positive correlation between IMP and the added value of the private sector 
(correlation of 97% with the nominal added value and of 84% if the latter is 
expressed in real terms). The annual trends of these variables appear to be very 
closely linked over the past decade: the main stages of upturn (in 2000 and 2006) 
or downturn (in 2001-2002 and 2008-2009) of credit dynamics occurred at the 
same time as a higher or lower growth in added value (Graph 8). During the crisis 
of the past two years, VAK has changed from an annual growth rate of 1.9% in 
the third quarter of 2007 (+5% for VAN) to an average annual fall of 6.3% in the 
first six months of this year (-3.2% in nominal terms). 
The figures also show a negative correlation (-34%) between IMP and 
MOL/VAN. In the past decade, the gross operating margin as a percentage of 
VAN has recorded a highly irregular trend, not always correlated to the real cycle 
of added value20: the trend of these two variables however, has been perfectly 
correlated for the past year (Graph 9). From the second half of 2008, the 
economic recession actually caused both a collapse of real added value and a 
considerable drop in the gross operating margin as a percentage of nominal added 
value (from 40.8% in the second quarter of 2008 to 38.6% in the second quarter of 
2009). In the second quarter of 2009, MOL has shown a y-o-y fall of 8.6% (from 
+3.4% in the second quarter of 2008); the fall in VAN (from +2.5% y-o-y in the 
second quarter of 2008 to -3.4% in the second quarter of this year; see Graph 10) 
has been less marked.   
Therefore, the economic crisis appears to have also provoked a reduction in the 
self-financing capacity of the private sector, particularly in the last stage. This 
could have made the demand for bank loans by companies rise, partially 
compensating the lower demand caused by a fall in production activity.  
A. ECM: the Engle and Granger two-steps procedure 
Following Engle and Granger’s two step procedure, we initially estimated, using 
the Ordinary Least Squares method (OLS), the following long-run equation: 
t
t
t
ttt VAN
MOLVAKTIMPtrendIMP ελλλλλ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛++++= ln)ln()()ln()1( 43210  
                                                 
20 The cyclical component of real added value has been found using the long-run trend 
calculated by applying the Hodrick-Prescott’s filter. 
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where )ln(⋅  represents the variable’s natural logarithm. 
Equation (1) represents the long-run credit demand function. All of the 
variables considered in this equation are non-stationary21: this justifies the use of 
an error correction model. The residual term tt ECM=ε , which represents the 
disequilibrium error in the long-run equation, is on the other hand stationary 
(Table 2). The variables in question therefore are cointegrated22.  
Equation (1) therefore explains the cointegrating relationship that links, in the 
long run, outstanding loans to the production sector with the added value of the 
private sector, the gross operating margin and the average real interest rate applied 
to loans23. 
In the second step of the procedure, we estimated the short-run equation, 
taking into account the disequilibrium error obtained in the long-run relationship 
at t-1 ( 1−tECM ). The credit demand function thus becomes the following: 
tt
t
t
tttt uECMVAN
MOLVAKTIMPIMPIMP ++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+=Δ −− ][ln)ln()()ln()ln()2( 143211 θββββα
where Δ  indicates the first difference operator. 
This model therefore enables us to explain the changes in the dependent 
variable as a result of the interaction of two components:  
• The error correction component ( ][ 1−tECMθ ), where θ  represents the speed of 
adjustment of loans, namely the fraction of the disequilibrium error at time t-1 
that is corrected to time t. 
• The short-run component, identified in the first differences of TIMP, 
ln(VAK), ln(MOL/VAN) and ln(IMPt-1). The coefficient vector 
( 1β , 2β , 3β , 4β ) represents the short-run impact on the lending growth rate of 
a change in said variables.  
The estimations of the coefficients of equations (1) and (2), made by taking the 
pre-crisis period as a sample, are all statistically significant and have the expected 
sign (Table 3).  
The adjustment coefficient θ  is negative and statistically significant, 
demonstrating the correct specification of the error correction mechanism and 
satisfying the stability condition: in each period, the growth rate of loans reacts in a 
                                                 
21 The unit root tests (Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test), conducted on the entire estimation 
period, support the non-stationarity hypothesis of ln(IMP), TIMP, ln(VAK) and ln(MOL/VAN). 
The non-stationarity of the real interest rate on loans is explained by its downward trend 
within the sample.  
22 The variables in question, taken separately, are all non-stationary; however, a linear 
combination of the same, represented by (1), is stationary. This means that the variables are 
cointegrated.  
23 This relation depends on the values of the long-run coefficients ( 0λ , 1λ , 2λ , 3λ , 4λ ), also 
called equilibrium coefficients. 
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significant way to the change in the disequilibrium error of the previous period, 
adjusting itself towards long-run equilibrium.   
With reference to the parameters of most interest, we can see a very significant 
long-run relationship between the demand for loans, TIMP, VAK and 
MOL/VAN. In the long run, the demand for bank lending by the production 
sector increases (more than proportionally) as real added value increases, while it 
decreases as MOL/VAN increases (and therefore as a company’s self-financing 
capacity increases)24; the demand for loans also reacts negatively to an increase in 
the cost of lending25. The sign and the statistical significance of said relationships is 
also confirmed by the short-run estimations (see the coefficients 2β , 3β , 4β  
represented in Table 3).   
The interpretation of these results would indicate that more a company 
produces, the higher quantity of credit it will need. On the contrary, as self-
financing increases, there is a lesser need for external sources of funding: this leads 
to a lower demand for bank credit. Lastly, as the interest rate on loans rises, there 
is a lower demand for loans due to the higher cost of funding. These 
interpretations apply both to long and short-run relationships.  
B. ECM: the one-step procedure 
An alternative procedure entails estimating both the long and short run 
relationships at the same time in a single equation, (one step single equation 
procedure)26.  
Combining (1) and (2) we get: 
t
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24 The values of the long-run coefficient of the credit demand equation show that if the VAK 
rises by 1% we have a rise of almost 2% in IMP, while if the MOL/VAN ratio rises by 1% we 
have a fall of around 0,3% in IMP.  
25 The value of the long-run coefficient on the interest rate indicates that a fall of 100 basis 
points in TIMP would lead to a rise of around 1% in IMP. The use of the interest rate on loans 
to medium-large non-financial firms, not considering the rate applied to smaller firms, could 
lead to a distortion in the estimation of the relationship between the loan demand of the 
production sector and the interest rate applied to loans. As the interest rate on loans to 
smaller firms is generally higher than that applied to medium-large size companies, this 
distortion could lead to an overestimation of the demand for loans; said distortion could lead to 
a higher “theoretical” (forecasted) value of loans. This would further substantiate the 
conclusions reached in Section 5.2, in which the credit disbursed during the crisis is compared 
to the theoretical value forecasted by the model on the basis of the pre-crisis functional 
relationships. 
26 This approach provides slightly different results to the two-step one, as in the latter the 
coefficients of the long-run relationship are calculated before and then inserted into the short-
run equation as deterministic values (not to be estimated). In the “one step single equation 
procedure”, by simultaneously estimating the long and short run, the equilibrium coefficients 
of the long-run relationship cannot be established a priori. 
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The OLS estimations of equation (3), computed again by taking as reference 
the sample period 1998-2007, overall provide results similar to those obtained with 
the two-step procedure (Table 3); the only substantial difference is that the 
relationship linking credit demand to firm’s gross operating margin in the long run 
is not significant: however, the coefficient still has a minus sign. The inverse 
relationship between the demand for loans and the firm’s self-financing 
component is instead significant in the short run (at a confidence level of 90%)27.  
C. VECM: analysis of a multivariate system 
The underlying assumption of the ECM specification is the weak exogeneity of 
the independent variables in the credit demand equation. From a theoretical 
perspective, however, it is possible that there may be retroactive effects and 
simultaneity relationships between loans demand, the dynamics of added value and 
gross operating margin and the cost of bank lending. For example, it may be that 
as the credit disbursed rises, its immediate effect is a rise in added value or a rise in 
MOL; or there could be another equation whose dependent variable is the interest 
rate on loans (loans supply function). 
In order to test the validity and robustness of the results obtained with the 
ECM specification, we therefore need to verify what would happen without the 
weak exogeneity assumption.  
To do this, we use a vector autoregressive model (VAR), a system of 
simultaneous equations where each variable is considered endogenous. 
The variables considered in the system are ln(IMP), TIMP, ln(VAK), and 
ln(MOL/VAN), the same analysed in the ECM specification. As suggested by the 
results obtained in the lag order determination tests (Table 4), we use a VAR with 
a lag: 
)VWN(0,~
)4(
1
0
∑
+Φ+= ∑
=
−
t
i
titt YY
ε
εμ  
where )]/ln(),ln(,),[ln( VANMOLVAKTIMPIMPYt = . 
The variables considered in the model are all non-stationary (Table 2): however, 
one or more cointegrating relationships may exist that render their linear 
combination stationary. Johansen’s trace test indicates the existence of a 
cointegrating vector that links IMP, TIMP, VAK and MOL/VAN in the long run 
(Table 5).  
Starting from (4) we therefore construct a four-equation VECM (Vector Error 
Correction Model), characterised by a cointegrating equation (long-run demand for 
loans) with intercept and trend and a lag in short-run relationships.  
                                                 
27 In regard to the sign, the significance and the interpretation of the other coefficients, we 
confirm what we said describing the two-stage procedure’s results. 
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The VECM estimated is as follows: 
( ) ( )
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
+⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−−−−−
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
+
+
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
Δ
Δ
Δ
Δ
Β=
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
Δ
Δ
Δ
Δ
−
−
−−−−
−−
−
−
−
MOL
t
VAK
t
TIMP
t
IMP
t
t
t
tttt
tt
t
t
t
tt
t
t
t
u
u
u
u
VAN
MOL
VAKTIMPtrendIMP
VANMOL
VAK
TIMP
IMP
VANMOL
VAK
TIMP
IMP
1
1
413121101
4
3
2
1
11
1
1
1
ln)ln()()ln(
/ln
)ln(
)(
)ln(
/ln
)ln(
)(
)ln(
)5(
λλλλλ
θ
θ
θ
θ
 
where B represents the matrix of short-run coefficients and ( 1θ , 2θ , 3θ , 4θ ) the 
vector of adjustment coefficients.  
The estimations of (5) show a long-run relationship that is very similar to that 
obtained with the ECM (Table 6). The demand for loans increases as real added 
value increases and falls as the interest rate on loans rises and as self-financing 
increases; all of the long-run coefficients estimated are also highly statistically 
significant. Adjustment coefficients 3θ  and 4θ  however, are not significant: VAK 
and MOL/VAN do not react in a significant manner to the disequilibrium error 
generated in the long-run relationship of the previous period.  
Some of the variables considered endogenous, could in reality be treated as 
exogenous. Weak exogeneity tests are therefore conducted in order to verify if it is 
possible to specify the model in a more parsimonious way28. As in Sorensen, 
Ibanez and Rossi (2009) and Casolaro, Eramo and Gambacorta (2006), following 
Johansen’s procedure (1992), restrictions are introduced to the VECM 
specification and, verifying the statistical significance of the adjustment 
coefficients, weak exogeneity tests are conducted on each variable.   
These tests (Table 7) lead us to accept the hypothesis of weak exogeneity of 
ln(VAK), ln(MOL/VAN) and TIMP. This implies that the only variable that can 
be considered endogenous is loans, justifying and confirming the results obtained 
by the single-equation model (ECM): the test results permit us to rewrite equation 
(5) in the simpler form expressed by (2) or (3).  
The weak exogeneity of TIMP, however, is the most difficult to accept from 
the tests29; furthermore, the joint weak exogeneity test on ln(VAK), 
ln(MOL/VAN) and TIMP is rejected at a confidence level of 90%, while the joint 
exogeneity of ln(VAK) and ln(MOL/VAN) is accepted. Therefore, even though 
the validity of equations (2) and (3) has been demonstrated,  we verify how the 
results would change if only loans and the real interest rate are considered 
                                                 
28 When a variable is weakly exogenous, the model can be rewritten, without any loss of 
information, in a partial version that excludes the modelling of the same variable. Weakly 
exogenous variables may in any event continue to appear in long and short-run relationships.  
29 Even though the test leads to the acceptance of the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity, it 
shows a level of significance very close to the 10% threshold (Table 7). 
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endogenous; starting from (5), we therefore use a more parsimonious model 
(reduced form VECM), characterised by a two-equation system: 
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The estimations in (6) confirm the long-run relationships calculated previously 
(Table 8): the new cointegrating vector identified is very similar to that identified in 
(5) and to that obtained by the  non-vectorial ECM (equations 2 and 3)30. The two 
adjustment coefficients are also both statistically significant. In addition, the short-
run relationships are also significant or coherent with economic theory.  
5.2 Credit during the crisis: a comparison with the forecasts of the model  
In this last part of the paper, using the coefficients estimated with the different 
techniques described above, we make a dynamic out of sample forecast, starting 
from the third quarter of 2007, the period in which the financial crisis started. Like 
in the estimation stage, we look first at the dynamic forecast of the ECM model 
and then verify how the dynamic forecast of multivariate systems (VECM) 
diverges from them.  
The performance of the ECM in the estimation period (1998:2 – 2007:2) is very 
good: the one-period ahead static forecast, provides an average forecast error of 
only 0.4% (around 2.4 billion euro) both with the one and two step procedures 
(Graphs 11-12). This corroborates the results we obtain with the out-of-sample 
dynamic forecast.  
The results of the dynamic forecast conducted on the last two years diverge 
considerably from the actual value of loans: as can be seen in Graph 13, the 
outstanding loans figure is always higher than that forecast by the ECM on the 
basis of the functional relationships estimated before the crisis. Loans 
demonstrated a divergent trend with respect to their theoretical level, both with 
the two-steps and one-step approaches; the difference between actual loans and 
their forecast value – statistically significant from the third quarter of 2007 
onwards – grows as the crisis intensifies. In the fourth quarter of 2008 and in the 
first three months of this year, the period in which the GDP dropped the most, 
this sort of “extra-credit” exceeded 80 billion euro on the basis of the one-step 
approach and 90 billion according to the two step approach; in mid 2009, it was 
                                                 
30 Overall, the following relationships emerge from the long-run loan demand equations 
estimated: if VAK rises by 1%, IMP rises by around 2%; if the MOL/VAN ratio increase by 1%, 
IMP falls by 0.3%-0.5%; a fall of 100 basis points in TIMP leads to an increase of around 1% in 
IMP. 
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around 100 billion, an additional 12% of loans compared to that justified by the 
changed macroeconomic scenario31. 
The same forecasting method can be applied to the estimations obtained by the 
VECM specification, both in its complete form and in the parsimonious model 
(reduced form model). The dynamic forecast of multivariate systems is performed 
only using the equation of the model in which lending is a dependent variable32, in 
order to verify how bank lending should have behaved in the last two years, given 
the performance of the determinants of demand and on the basis of the 
relationships identified by the system.  
The results of the forecasting exercise conducted on the multivariate systems 
lead to the same conclusions reached with the ECM specifications (Graphs 14-15): 
the positive difference between actual outstanding loans and their forecast value 
continues to increase during the crisis.  This difference materialises – both with the 
VECM and in the reduced form system – at the end of 2008 and in the first half of 
2009 with values of between 80 and 100 billion33. 
So what does this “extra-credit” represent and why did it develop? A possible 
theoretical explanation can be obtained by using a supply and demand model of 
bank loans (L = IMP), represented on a Cartesian plan (Graph 16) as a function of 
the real interest rate (i = TIMP). Starting from a hypothetical market equilibrium 
P*, in place before the crisis,  we see what could have happened in the last two 
years. The collapse of production activities and the reduction of investment 
programmes provoked a fall in the credit demand34: the result was a leftward shift 
of the demand curve. Maintaining the pre-crisis relationships and the initial supply 
curve constant, the theoretical equilibrium P1 identifies the quantity of credit L1 
coherent with the new level of added value and the MOL shown during the 
crisis35: L1 therefore represent the outstanding loans forecasted by the model.   
                                                 
31 This result cannot be compared to that obtained in a recent IMF study contained in the 
October 2009 Global Financial Stability Report and referred to by Onado (2009) in a recent 
article he wrote for LaVoce.info. This IMF study, which finds a financing gap (excess of demand 
with respect to the supply of credit) in 2009 of 460 billion, in the first place refers to the whole 
euro area and not to Italy, where, as we have seen, the credit situation is better; furthermore, 
in this IMF study, credit demand also includes that of the public sector, which in 2009 was 
almost double that of the private sector; lastly, unlike the analysis conducted in this paper, the 
IMF study was conducted using forecasts for 2009 and 2010 and seeks to estimate future 
credit capacity. There are a number of differences in terms of methodology and objectives with 
respect to this paper.  
32 Therefore the model solution is found only considering the loans equation and excluding the 
other equations of the system; with the exception of loans, the other variables considered 
endogenous in the system being estimated, are treated in the forecast (in the solution of the 
model) as exogenous. 
33 This differential obtained by the multivariate systems, slightly lower in the first period with 
respect to the non-vectorial approaches, rose considerably over the course of 2008 and in the 
first half of 2009, showing a trend in the last stage very like that obtained with the one-step 
ECM. 
34 This should have more than offset the positive effect on demand resulting from the 
simultaneous fall in self-financing.  
35 This explanation also consider the monetary effects caused by inflation. 
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The outstanding loans observed were nevertheless higher than L1: this 
difference was formed due to a change in pre-crisis relationships and by virtue of a 
rightward shift of the supply curve, in line with the lower level of interest rates. 
Equilibrium P2 represents actual market equilibrium and L2 are the outstanding 
loans actually recorded during the last two years.   
The concept of “extra-credit” can therefore be identified as the difference 
between L2 and L1 and is explained by a rightward shift of the supply curve; 
instead, if there had been a credit crunch, we would have expected to see a 
significant leftward shift of the credit supply curve, as indicated in the definition by 
Bernanke and Lown36.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The empirical evidence presented in this paper supports the theory according to 
which, in Italy, over the course of the recent economic and financial crisis, despite 
a considerable slowdown in bank lending, there has not been a credit crunch.  
The paper moves from an analysis of credit trends in the production sector, 
first demonstrating how the dynamics of the same were much more positive than 
those recorded for important economic variables such as, for example, industrial 
production.  In the period between September 2008 and August 2009, the average 
annual growth rate of loans (seasonally-adjusted) was 4.5% compared to a 
corresponding average fall in industrial output of 16.8%. This aspect is particularly 
important in the light of the causality link between the two variables, which, 
conducted on a time series appropriately cleaned of trends, and using Granger’s 
casuality test, demonstrated that bank lending is determined (caused) by industrial 
production and not vice versa.  
Given that industrial production today represents a minor part of economic 
activity, the paper then focused on credit related to the output produced as a 
whole. From the analyses, it appears that over the course of 2008 and in the first 
six months of 2009, the bank credit-to-GDP ratio (credit per unit of GDP) slowed 
down but never fell; furthermore, the annual trend was far higher than that 
experienced in previous downturns identified by the International Monetary Fund, 
which in a recent report identified the threshold for the change in the bank credit-
to-GDP ratio beyond which we can speak of credit squeeze/crunch as between     
-0.6 and -1%.  
In the paper, in order to take the whole series of determinants of credit demand 
into account, an error correction econometric model (ECM) was constructed – 
estimated on the pre-crisis period (1998.Q2 – 2007.Q2) and applied using both the 
one-step and two-step procedure – which considers loans as a function of the 
added value of the private sector, of the gross operating margin to nominal added 
value ratio (a proxy for self-financing) and of the real interest rate on loans. To test 
                                                 
36 See Section 3. 
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the robustness of the results obtained, we then removed the assumption of weak 
exogeneity of the independent variables of the single-equation model and 
constructed a multivariate multi-equation system (VECM).  
All of the different approaches and methods used provided similar results: as 
expected, credit demand increases as the real added value increases and falls as the 
cost of lending and self-financing increase. Weak exogeneity tests would also 
appear to indicate that the only variable that can certainly be considered 
endogenous in the multivariate system is loans, confirming the results obtained 
with the single-equation non-vectorial model (ECM).  
The dynamic out-of-sample forecast of the model, relating to the two year 
period of economic and financial crisis (2007.Q3 – 2009.Q2), shows that the actual 
loan stock was far higher than the “theoretical” level forecasted on the basis of the 
functional relationships estimated before the crisis. This delta, a sort of “extra-
credit”, estimated to be over 80 billion euro (10-13% of loans) at the end of the 
first half of 2009, can be interpreted as the result of a rightward shift of the credit 
supply curve and not a leftward one as should have happened in the case of a 
credit crunch.  
If other factors are considered stable, and given the difficult economic scenario, 
the higher propensity to grant credit could be the result of the increased awareness 
of the banking industry of all of those aspects – beyond traditional ones – that 
tend to reinforce medium/long run relationships with customers (higher 
consideration of firm’s income prospects, personal and long-lasting relationships 
with entrepreneurs etc.). 
These conclusions have been drawn from macroeconomic data. It would be 
interesting to conduct further exploration, conducting some disaggregation,  to test 
any asymmetries in the results from a territorial, sector-related or dimensional 
perspective. A further development could be to extend the research to the main 
countries of the euro area.  
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Graph 1 
Growth rate of loans to the private sector  
(seasonally-adjusted data; % val.) 
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Source: our calculations on Bank of Italy data 
 
 
 
 
Graph 2 
 Growth rate of loans to consumer households  
(seasonally-adjusted data; % val.) 
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Graph 3 
Growth rate of loans to the production sector 
(seasonally-adjusted data; % val.) 
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Graph 4 
Growth rate of loans to non-financial firms: an international comparison 
(annualised quarterly % change; seasonally-adjusted data) 
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Graph 5 
Credit and industrial production: annual growth rates  
(% change; on seasonally-adjusted data) 
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Graph 6 
Credit and industrial production: the cyclical component  
(percentage gap with respect to the long-run trend) 
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Graph 7 
Dynamics of the bank credit-to-GDP ratio of the production sector  
(% change; quarterly data 2000:2 - 2009:2) 
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Source: our calculations on Bank of Italy data e Istat 
 
 
Graph 8 
Loans and Added value of the private sector: annual growth rates 
(quarterly data; % change) 
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Source: our calculations on Bank of Italy data e Istat 
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Graph 9 
Added value and gross operating margin 
(quarterly data) 
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Source: our calculations on Istat data 
 
 
Graph 10 
Gross operating margin and nominal added value: annual growth rates 
(quarterly data; % change) 
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Source: our calculations on Istat data 
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Graph 11 
The performance of the 2-step ECM in 1998-2007 
(figures in euro millions) 
380000
420000
460000
500000
540000
580000
620000
660000
700000
740000
780000
820000
19
98
.Q
3
19
98
.Q
4
19
99
.Q
1
19
99
.Q
2
19
99
.Q
3
19
99
.Q
4
20
00
.Q
1
20
00
.Q
2
20
00
.Q
3
20
00
.Q
4
20
01
.Q
1
20
01
.Q
2
20
01
.Q
3
20
01
.Q
4
20
02
.Q
1
20
02
.Q
2
20
02
.Q
3
20
02
.Q
4
20
03
.Q
1
20
03
.Q
2
20
03
.Q
3
20
03
.Q
4
20
04
.Q
1
20
04
.Q
2
20
04
.Q
3
20
04
.Q
4
20
05
.Q
1
20
05
.Q
2
20
05
.Q
3
20
05
.Q
4
20
06
.Q
1
20
06
.Q
2
20
06
.Q
3
20
06
.Q
4
20
07
.Q
1
20
07
.Q
2
-8000
-6000
-4000
-2000
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
Loans to the production sector (actual)
Loans to the production sector (one period ahead static forecast; 2 steps ECM)
Forecast error (one period ahead static forecast) - right scale
 
Source: our calculations on Bank of Italy and Istat data 
 
 
Graph 12 
The performance of the 1-step ECM in 1998-2007 
(figures in euro millions) 
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Source: our calculations on Bank of Italy and Istat data 
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Graph 13 
Bank lending during the crisis and dynamic forecast of the ECM  
(figures in euro millions) 
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Source: our calculations on Bank of Italy and Istat data 
 
 
 
Graph 14 
Bank lending during the crisis and dynamic forecasts of the models: 
A comparison between ECM and VECM (figures in euro millions) 
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Source: our calculations on Bank of Italy and Istat data 
 30
Graph 15 
Credit during the crisis: the difference between actual values and forecast values 
(figures in euro millions) 
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Source: our calculations on Bank of Italy data e Istat 
 
 
 
Graph 16 
“Extra-Credit”: a theoretical explanation 
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Source: our elaborations 
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Table 1 
Credit and industrial production: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Industrial production does not Granger cause Loans to the production sector 8.911 0.000
Loans to the production sector do not Granger cause Industrial production 1.291 0.279
Lags: 2
The test considers the variables' cyclical components, obtained removing the long period components (computed using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter).
Sample period: 06:1999 - 07:2009 (monthly data)
Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Probability
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Stationarity test:  Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test 
Sample period: 1998:Q1 - 2007:Q2 (quarterly data)
Null hypothesis: unit root (non-stationarity)
1% 5% 10%
ln(IMP) -0.019 0.951 -3.627 -2.946 -2.612
TIMP -1.991 0.289 -3.679 -2.968 -2.623
ln(VAK) -0.946 0.762 -3.627 -2.946 -2.612
ln(MOL/VAN) -2.243 0.195 -3.621 -2.943 -2.610
ε  = ECM -3,383 ** 0.018 -3.627 -2.946 -2.612
1 MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
** We can reject the null hypothesis at a significance level of 5%.
Test Critical ValuesTest statistic Prob 1Variable
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Table 3 
Error Correction Model estimates 
Coefficients Regressors
-0.548 *** -0.492 ***
(0,157) (0,129)
0.012 *** 0.012 ***
(0,001) (0,001)
-1.145 *** -0.959 ***
(0,192) (0,304)
1.858 *** 1.942 ***
(0,170) (0,333)
-0.320 ** -0.375
(0,136) (0,293)
0.482 *** 0.406 ***
(0,109) (0,143)
-0.682 *** -0.591 **
(0,204) (0,224)
0.763 *** 0.707 ***
(0,224) (0,248)
-0.196 ** -0.189 *
(0,086) (0,109)
equazione
di lungo periodo
trend
ln(VAK)
TIMP
Estimation procedure:
Standard errors in brackets.
Δln(VAK t )
Δln(MOL t /VAN t )
Δln(IMP t-1 )
Δ(TIMP t )
ln(MOL/VAN)
The symbols ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level.
Estimation method: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
long-run 
coefficients
short-run 
coefficients
Sample period: 1998:Q2 - 2007:Q2  (quarterly data)
adjustment 
coefficient
Two steps
(Engle and Granger procedure)
One step
(single equation procedure)
(1) - (2) (3)Equation:
1λ
θ
2λ
3λ
4λ
1β
2β
3β
4β
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
VAR: lag order determination tests 
Endogenous variables: ln(IMP), TIMP, ln(VAK), e ln(MOL/VAN)
Sample period: 1999:Q1 - 2007:Q2
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0 335.5149 NA 2.21E-14 -20.09181 -19.91042 -20.03078
1 505.3535   288,2110*   1,99e-18* -29.41537  -28,50839*  -29,11020*
2 518.5723 19.22725 2.47E-18 -29.2468 -27.61425 -28.6975
3 533.8397 18.50596 2.92E-18 -29.20241 -26.84427 -28.40897
4 560.112 25.47614 2.03E-18  -29,82497* -26.74125 -28.78739
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)
 FPE: Final prediction error
 AIC: Akaike information criterion
 SC: Schwarz information criterion
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion  
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Table 5 
Johansen’s cointegration test  
Variables: ln(IMP), TIMP, ln(VAK), ln(MOL/VAN)
Sample period: 1999:Q1 - 2007:Q2
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
Null hypothesis:
No. of Cointegrating Equations (R)
R=0 * 69,098 63,876 0,017
R≤1 40,998 42,915 0,077
R≤2 18,321 25,872 0,323
R≤3 7,260 12,518 0,318
Trend assumption: Intercept and Trend in Cointegrating equation (Linear deterministic trend, restricted)
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
Trace 
Statistic
5%
 Critical Value Prob.**
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Vector Error Correction Model estimates 
Coefficient θ 1 θ 2 θ 3 θ 4
Dependent variable Δln(IMP t ) Δ(TIMP t ) Δln(VAK t ) Δln(MOL t /VAN t )
-0,556 *** -0,344 ** 0.041 0.139
(0,214) (0,148) (0,147) (0,403)
The symbols ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level.
Adjustment coefficients:
Cointegrating Vector (long-run equation):
Sample Period: 1998:Q2 - 2007Q:2  (quarterly data)
(Standard errors in brackets)
)/ln(455,0)ln(002,2)(428,1)(012,0105,12)ln( ***
)139,0(
***
)157,0(
***
)172,0(
***
)001,0(
VANMOLVAKTIMPtrendIMP −+−+−=
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Table 7 
VECM: weak exogeneity tests  
Dependent variable Δln(IMP t ) Δ(TIMP t ) Δln(VAK t ) Δln(MOL t /VAN t )
Null hypothesis: θ 1 = 0 θ 2 = 0 θ 3 = 0 θ 4 = 0
Weak exogeneity of: ln(IMP) TIMP ln(VAK) ln(MOL/VAN)
5.090 2.138 0.028 0.067
p-value 0.024 0.144 0.866 0.796
joint tests
θ 3 = 0 θ 2 = 0
θ 4 = 0 θ 3 = 0
θ 4 = 0
0.067 7.237
p-value 0.967 0.065
Weak exogeneity is accepted, at a confidence level of 95 (90) per cent, when the p-value is larger than 5 (10) per cent.
(LR test)
Null hypothesis: 
2χ
2χ
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Estimates of the VECM in reduced form 
Dependent variable: Δln(IMP t ) Δ(TIMP t )
-0,497*** -0,247***
(0,114) (0,083)
Regressors:
0,725*** -0,282***
(0,119) (0,071)
0.387 0,851***
(0,232) (0,178)
-0.354 -0,313*
(0,237) (0,183)
-0.119 -0.098
(0,084) (0,063)
Cointegrating Vector (long-run equation):
Estimation method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR )
Δln(MOL t /VAN t )
Adjustment 
coefficients 
short-run 
coefficients
The symbols ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level.
Sample period: 1998:Q2 - 2007:Q2  (quarterly data)
(VAK and MOL/VAN exogenous)
Standard errors in brackets.
θ i 
(con i=1,2)
Δln(IMP t-1 )
Δln(VAK t )
Δln(VAK t-1 )
)/ln(299,0)ln(906,1)(985,0)(013,0787,10)ln( *
)172,0(
***
)203,0(
***
)185,0(
***
)001,0(
VANMOLVAKTIMPtrendIMP −+−+−=
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